朝鲜宣称成功试射潜射弹道导弹（SLBM）并展示其核潜艇能力，引发国际社会对其是否已真正步入‘核潜艇俱乐部’的广泛讨论。严格意义上的‘核潜艇俱乐部’通常指拥有以核动力推进、可长期水下巡航并搭载核武器的战略核潜艇的国家，目前仅有美、俄、中、英、法五国。朝鲜虽未证实拥有核动力潜艇，但其通过改装常规柴电潜艇搭载潜射弹道导弹，实现了有限的二次核打击能力。2023年，朝鲜公开了名为‘新浦级’的新型潜艇，并称其为‘战术核攻击潜艇’，尽管专家普遍认为该艇仍为常规动力。然而，这种‘准核潜艇’战略使其在不对称威慑体系中占据一席之地。朝鲜发展潜射核能力的核心动因在于提升生存性与威慑力——相比固定发射井或公路机动发射车，潜艇更难被先发制人摧毁。此外，此举也是对美韩联合军演及制裁压力的战略回应。尽管技术上与真正核潜艇存在代差，但朝鲜正通过渐进式发展，逐步构建海基核威慑雏形，从而在地区安全格局中争取更多话语权。
North Korea’s claims of successfully testing a submarine-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) and showcasing nuclear-capable submarines have sparked global debate over whether it has truly entered the so-called ‘nuclear submarine club.’ Strictly speaking, this club refers to nations possessing nuclear-powered ballistic missile submarines (SSBNs) capable of extended underwater patrols and carrying nuclear warheads—currently limited to the U.S., Russia, China, the U.K., and France. While North Korea has not demonstrated a genuine nuclear-powered submarine, it has retrofitted conventional diesel-electric submarines to launch SLBMs, achieving a limited second-strike capability. In 2023, Pyongyang unveiled its ‘Sinpo-class’ submarine, labeling it a ‘tactical nuclear attack submarine,’ though experts widely assess it remains conventionally powered. Nevertheless, this ‘quasi-SSBN’ approach grants Pyongyang a niche in its asymmetric deterrence strategy. The core motivation behind developing sea-based nuclear capabilities lies in enhancing survivability and deterrence—submarines are far harder to preemptively destroy than fixed silos or road-mobile launchers. This move also serves as a strategic response to U.S.-South Korea joint military drills and ongoing sanctions. Despite significant technological gaps compared to true SSBNs, North Korea is incrementally advancing toward a rudimentary sea-based nuclear deterrent, seeking greater leverage in regional security dynamics.
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